In the recent Lopez v. State,  the defendant was convicted and appealed. The reviewing panel took a close look at the State’s proffered expert, psychologist Sam Hill III,  and his underlying methodology. It seems a trial judge asleep at the switch allowed Dr. Hill to testify to the truthfulness of the State’s complaining witness.  Referring to it as “truth testimony”  the panel explained that the prosecutor and Hill had “crossed the line between assisting the jury and attempting to replace the jury as trier of fact…”  This dilemma came about because Dr. Hill proposed to testify, based on his professional experience, that he had evaluated the truthfulness of teenage boys and that “generally, they tell the truth.” 
Commonwealth v. Sasse  demonstrates how important both common sense and science awareness can be to case planning. In Sasse, the defendant was convicted of third-degree murder and other offenses. The Superior Court held inter alia that defendant’s psychiatrist’s report was not admissible to establish the defense of legal insanity. When the psychiatrist went back to the drawing board and wrote a supplemental report, the Superior Court determined that it was not admissible during the guilt phase of the trial and the trial court was not even required to instruct the jury on the defense of legal insanity. How did this happen? We at PASattorney.com emphasize that it happened because of bad preparation by defendant’s counsel, the fact that defendant’s expert wrote reports speaking to the wrong standard, and because of clever cross examination. The reviewing court noted that the expert’s two reports conflicted with each other.  Further, the opponents demonstrated that they were untimely and presented multiple diagnoses. 
The tragedy of suicide often leaves the family searching for answers and hoping to find an easy scapegoat. In two Texas cases this past year, families sued health care providers for failing to prevent the suicides of their deceased loved ones. In Escobar v. Goss,  Beverly Goss had been hospitalized after a suicide attempt.  During her evaluation for involuntary commitment, Beverly was evaluated by Dr. Cesar Matos, who diagnosed her with clinical depression with suicidal ideation. She signed an application for voluntary admission to a mental hospital, where she spent several days.  After being confronted with deceitful behavior by Beverly to secure release, Dr. Matos cancelled his plans to discharge Beverly, and she became agitated and refused to take her medications. Dr. Matos sought Beverly’s commitment to the State psychiatric facility due to his belief that she required long-term care.  Beverly was transferred to the Rio Grande State Center, where she was seen by Dr. Diego Escobar. Dr. Escobar evaluated Beverly for possible involuntary commitment, where she was calm, rational, and denied suicidal ideation. Dr. Escobar did not believe Beverly was suicidal and did not feel she met the criteria for involuntary commitment and discharged her . Four days later, Beverly killed herself. The Goss family sued Dr. Escobar for negligence. At trial, Dr. Mary Anderson, a board-certified psychiatrist testified as to the standard of care for the Goss family. She opined that Dr. Escobar did not meet the standard of care in this situation:
Because (1) he did not consult with Michael, who had filed the paperwork to have Beverly involuntarily committed, who claimed that she would try to kill herself again, and who did not believe the situation was manageable outside the hospital setting; (2) he did not consult with Beverly’s other doctors who believed that she needed further hospitalization; and (3) he did not look beyond Beverly’s own report that she was not suicidal even though the information available showed that she had “severe depression, recent suicidal ideation, recent suicide attempt, very little change and refusing treatment in that week of hospitalization….” 
The jury found in favor of the Goss family. 
At PASattorney.com we take note that In the second case, Rio Grande Regional Hospital v. Villareal,  the family of Hermes Villareal sued the hospital after Hermes committed suicide while in the hospital’s care.  Hermes, a lawyer, had suddenly developed severe neurological symptoms, including severe headaches and insomnia. These symptoms left him unable to think clearly and greatly distressed.  He sought admission to the hospital to address his symptoms.  Once hospitalized, Hermes spoke with Dr. Martin Tavarez and Dr. Tommy Yee about his symptoms but denied any feelings of depression. The doctors prescribed a daily dose of an anti-depressant and an anti-anxiety medication to take as needed.  The next day, Hermes had an MRI, which revealed no abnormal brain function. This greatly concerned Hermes, as his symptoms continued unabated.  That night, he was given Ambien as well as Xanax by Nurse Gaye Bergado to help him sleep, which he did not do very successfully. The next morning, Hermes requested a razor to shave his chest where his EKG monitors were placed and got in the shower. He was not checked on again until after shift change, when he was found dead in the bathtub after cutting himself with the razor.  The Villareal family sued the hospital for wrongful death. At trial, Suzanne Frederick, R.N., testified that the nurses at the hospital had not met the standard of care in that they had failed to:
(1) [C]losely monitor the effects of the various medications that Hermes was taking, including those he had never taken before; (2) assist Hermes in taking a shower so as to prevent him from falling down or fainting in the shower; and (3) provide a safe environment, which did not include providing Hermes with a double-edged razor to shave his chest by himself. 
The family also presented the testimony of Dr. Gary Glass, a psychiatrist, who testified that the only reason for Dr. Tavarez to have prescribed the medication he did was for a diagnosis of depression, and that the failure to conduct a psychosocial examination was a breach of the standard of care.  The appellate panel affirmed the jury’s finding for the Villareal family. Both of these “assessment of lethality” cases are tragic. They are tragic for the families and tragic for the defendants as well. The families lost their loved ones and the defendants lost cogent cross-examination into predictability and lethality standard of care.
In another interesting standard of care case, a Federal District court in New Mexico reiterated the requirement that as witch hunts come and go,  the government must keep investigator’s notes. In U.S. v. Lujan,  the defendants, charged with kidnapping and murder, made numerous pre trial motions. One set of motions asked for disclosure of exculpatory information regarding the integrity and reliability of the investigation underlying the prosecution. Making Brady and Kyles demands,  the defendants asked the Court to compel the government to contact all law enforcement officers to learn how the case was investigated. Specifically, defendants requested information on whether agents failed to follow policies and regulations, whether they recorded contacts with potential witnesses, whether there was communication between witnesses, whether witnesses were permitted to learn the government’s theory of the case, and whether witnesses were allowed to see investigators’ materials. 
Relying on precedent from Federal District Courts in Kansas and Ohio, District Court Judge Robert Brack reasoned that, “[b]ecause the contents of rough interview notes may in some cases be subject to disclosure and because the potential impeachment value of the notes may not become evident until trial, I will grant Defendants’ request for an order to preserve rough interview notes made by law enforcement agents during interviews of potential witnesses.” 
Johnson v. Rogers Memorial Hospital et al. 
requires a healthy measure of common sense and science awareness. In Rogers, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was faced with “counselor” Kay Phillips and psychologists Jeff Hollowell and Tim Reisenauer, who all participated in the creation of a belief in young Charlotte Johnson that she simply forgot that her father and mother abused her. 
It staggers the imagination to think that there are actually licensed psychologists who subscribe to the belief that someone can be viciously abused both physically and sexually and then simply forget about it. The heights of narcissism are reached by the “therapists” and psychologists who hold that it is only through their skilled intervention that the patients can “recover” the memories of terrible abuse. At PASattorney.com we ask the reader to imagine for a moment how these self aggrandizing claims denigrate the very real memories and pain of girls and boys who have really been abused.
Undeterred by confrontation of their silliness and narcissism, Phillips, Hollowell and Reisenauer each maintained the value of their individual insight into Charlotte’s fantasized problem. Indeed, the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted from the record that shortly after the Johnsons’ daughter began psychotherapy treatment with Kay Phillips, Phillips referred Charlotte to Rogers Memorial Hospital for eating and addictive disorders and for sexual and physical abuse treatment. Charlotte was admitted as an inpatient to Rogers Memorial where she received “therapy” from Jeff Hollowell and Tim Reisenauer. This is alleged to have been the specific time that the belief her father Charles raped her and her mother Karen physically abused her was solidified. 
When sued by the parents, the counselor, psychologists and their institutions claimed every sort of immunity, privilege and special dispensation possible. After the Johnsons began their suit, the trial court dismissed the parents’ action, and the parents appealed. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed but their Supreme Court reversed. But on remand, the trial court denied the parents’ motion to compel access to Charlotte’s treatment records and then granted the psychotherapists’ summary judgment motions. Again the parents appealed, and this time the Court of Appeals certified the case. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held inter alia that Charlotte had not waived her therapist-patient privilege even with the unlicensed therapist. Just when the counselor, psychologists and their institutions thought they’d won again (by essentially hiding what they had done), the Wisconsin Supreme Court took a bold step for science and consumers of behavioral science services. The Court reversed and remanded the case holding that public policy required a limited exception to the therapist-patient privilege and to confidentiality in patient health care records where negligent therapy caused false accusations against parents for sexually or physically abusing their child.
In the case of Wilson v. Phillips,  one must wonder if an appellate court should sua sponte determine that evidence is ridiculous. In Wilson, one Dr. Diana Elliot, a psychologist “specializing in the field of sexual abuse and memory” 
was called by plaintiffs to support their claim that they had “recovered” memories that defendant molested them. According to the panel, “Dr. Elliot believed [the plaintiff’s] psychological profiles, including the manner in which they recalled being molested, were consistent with other individuals who had repressed their memories of childhood sexual abuse.”
Unfortunately for the defendant and all those who must face these idiotic claims, “Phillips did not offer any experts to refute Dr. Elliot’s testimony.” 
We at PASattorney.com emphasize another case underscores the perils of goofy psychology. In Maggard v. Board of Psychology, professional witness Elmer Maggard appealed from an order of the trial court affirming a final order of the State Board of Examiners of Psychology suspending his license to practice psychology.
It seems Elmer was asked by an attorney to perform a psychological evaluation of a three year old girl. The girl’s parents had filed suit against a dentist who had treated the girl when she was approximately seventeen months old. Maggard met with the girl’s parents in his office on two occasions, but he only had contact with the girl for a brief period during one visit. Nonetheless, Maggard prepared a written “Summary of Clinical Assessment”, in which he opined that the girl had suffered a permanent psychological injury as a result of the treatment she received from the dentist. Furthermore, he concluded the injury would have a long term effect on her social and emotional development. 
The dentist filed a complaint with the Board of Psychology.
Remember, Maggard had spent only minutes with the little girl. The Board of Psychology and the reviewing courts carefully went through the record and noted that despite spending only a few moments with the child, Dr. Maggard opined:
A. The child has been emotionally and developmentally injured by the trauma she experienced during dental treatment to extract two of her front teeth.
B. In addition to her anxiety she exhibits aggression and anger consistent with the nature of the injury as it was described by her mother.
C. This type of early trauma causes permanent psychological injury and can have pervasive consequences for subsequent social and emotional development.
D. For a child [L.W.’s] age, the effects of such trauma can even affect character structure.
E. Ongoing treatment with [L.W.] and her family, possibly over a number of years, probably will be necessary to manage the generalized behavioral and emotional consequences of the child’s psychological injury. She could require professional help into her mid-to-late adolescence…
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to support the Board’s findings that Elmer provided formal opinions about the child without having direct and substantial professional contact with her, and without conducting a formal assessment. They affirmed the sanction.
In McKenzie v. Benton, 
Ms. Lorraine “Jade” McKenzie sued the Sheriff of Natrona County, Wyoming under the Americans with Disabilities Act. It seems that Ms. McKenzie had worked as a deputy sheriff for some ten years and risen to the rank of sergeant. At some time, Ms. McKenzie began a course of counseling with someone named Darlene Bayu, a licensed counselor. 
According to Ms. McKenzie, she suffered from a variety of psychological afflictions, including post- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) related to childhood sexual abuse by her father. As her condition worsened, she began to miss work frequently. 
One day, McKenzie fired six rounds from her off-duty revolver into the ground at her father’s grave. 
The next day the Sheriff put her on administrative leave and told her she’d have to have a psychological evaluation. When things didn’t turn out as she wished, she sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The record is unclear as to where the idea to shoot her father’s grave full of holes came from. The record does not reveal whether “licensed counselor” Darlene Bayu or treating psychiatrist Dr. Arlene Viray recommended it as a therapeutic measure. If they had, Ms. McKenzie may have had a better chance with the jury. Because after her fellow officers and several experts testified, the jury decided that she was disabled alright, but she was also a “direct threat” to the community. Verdict for the defense, sustained on appeal. We at PASattorney.com feel that Probably the most notable portion in the appellate opinion from the Tenth Circuit is the testimony from one of the experts about Ms. McKenzie’s PTSD: “over half of all people who have PTSD symptoms can recover within one year and PTSD is something one can recover from.” 
We certainly agree.
The skepticism natural among seasoned litigators serves well in cases involving experts, therapists and psychological damages. We at PASattorney.com take for example, in Figueroa v. Simplicity Plan de Puerto Rico,  the Federal District Court in Puerto Rico needed both common sense and a keen cultural awareness. Figueroa found many members of a large Puerto Rican family in psychotherapy for what was to them a traumatic (and culturally nuanced) event. It seems that on Christmas Day, Mrs. Eulogia Luciano-Méndez passed away in Puerto Rico. Plaintiffs, the Figueroas, were informed of the death of Mrs. Méndez and made arrangements to travel to Puerto Rico to attend her funeral. Plaintiffs contracted the services of the defendants, Simplicity, to organize the wake and burial of the deceased and provide a coffin as well. During the burial service, when the coffin was being lowered into the ground, the casket fell into the grave. Due to the impact of the fall, the upper half of the casket opened. As defendants’ agents lifted the coffin, the casket opened further exposing the upper body of the deceased and revealing her face, which had been bruised and altered. Some family members screamed and some fainted. Defendants replaced the coffin of the deceased and continued the service. 
Defendant funeral home hired psychiatrist Dr. José Franceschini-Carlo to evaluate the plaintiffs and provide expert testimony. In his psychiatric report of plaintiff Modesto Figueroa, Dr. Franceschini-Carlo explained that the burial incident could not have modified or changed Mr. Figueroa’s personality. Dr. Franceschini-Carlo wrote that in order for Mr. Figueroa’s personality to have changed, “many things must happen.” However, he did not explain these triggers that could supposedly cause the personality of an individual to change. 
Dr. Franceschini-Carlo also asserted that Mrs. Julie Figueroa’s use of psychotherapy was motivated by economic gain, but he did not refer to any facts or scientific theory to support this reasoning.  Further, in his reports, Dr. Franceschini-Carlo recited facts and statements made by the plaintiffs that would be available to the trier of fact whether he prepared a report or not.
The aggrieved family fought back on Daubert grounds. They filed a motion in limine under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and asserted that defendants’ psychiatric report was irrelevant and inadmissible because it failed to assist the trier of fact. The plaintiffs also asserted that in his written report, the psychiatrist offered to judge the plaintiffs’ credibility, a power only allotted to the trier of fact. 
Defendants countered that Dr. Franceschini-Carlo’s testimony and report would assist the jury in determining whether the plaintiffs actually suffered the alleged emotional damages as a result of defendants’ negligence and mismanagement of the body. Defendants also claimed that their expert provided scientific data and analysis on the mental condition of each plaintiff in his report. 
The district judge found that Dr. Franceschini-Carlo presented a speculative argument that in fact judged the credibility of the plaintiffs. The court also found that Dr. Franceschini-Carlo did not demonstrate the method employed or any scientific basis upon which to found his conclusions. Indeed, the court could not find any reference to any source in the psychiatric community that would support his analysis.  For these reasons, the Federal Judge granted the plaintiffs’ motion in limine. 
In Perez v. State,  a man was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child and appealed. The record reveals that the child was born to defendant and a sixteen-year-old crack cocaine addict prostitute whom defendant befriended. The mother left when the child was two weeks old. The child lived with her father in approximately seventeen places by the time she was ten years old and attended school irregularly. The child was in and out of foster homes and shelters and during one examination, was discovered to have dental cavities and head lice, but a normal genital exam. In a latter exam, the child informed a doctor that her father was in jail for child molestation, and that it was because when she was “seven” she had “a rash down there” and her father kept cream on it, and that was all. 
When asked if she had been touched or bothered, the child told the physician that her “boyfriend” and another boy had had sexual intercourse with her. However, her genital examination was again normal.  The case depended largely on the credibility of the child who was ten years old at the time of the alleged events and twelve years old at the time of the trial. After two years in shelters, foster homes, treatment centers, and a variety of “treatments”, the child testified to facts supportive of the State’s indictment.  The problems for Mr. Perez were manifest. The child was in “therapy” for two years: first, with contract counselor Beth Arcotta and next with contract counselor Robin Beauregard. There seems to have been no attempt whatsoever documented in the record that any cross examiner worked to describe the influences of the two years of counseling on the child.
Further, it seems that, “…Dr. William Lee Carter, a psychologist, testified as an expert about symptoms and behaviors commonly seen in sexual abuse victims. In answer to hypothetical questions tailored to the facts of the instant case, Dr. Carter stated those facts indicated a sexually abused child…”
We at PASattorney.com have explained elsewhere that this sort of testimony amounts to the worst kind of junk science.  Unfortunately, when the defendant objected that Dr. Carter should not have been allowed to testify because the State did not sustain its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that Dr. Carter’s testimony was relevant and reliable – he was in Texas.  When Dr. Carter testified to his education, to having obtained a “speciality” certification and that “…the sub-field of child sexual abuse dynamic is a subject well established in the field of psychology…”, the trial court and the appellate court bought it hook, line and sinker. No where in the record does there seem to be any attempt to examine Dr. Carter or counselor Arcotta or counselor Beauregard about the interaction of ideas during the pretrial time or during the trial and its potential impact on the child. We at PASattorney.com believe cross examiners reading this blog will never make that mistake.
In State v. Henry,  junk science, hyperclaiming and causism all found their way into the record. In the testimony of therapist Coles Badger, we find veritably all of the myths of child sexual abuse litigation trotted out as science.  Ms. Badger described herself as a “psychotherapist.”  She testified that she was a member of the Board of Directors of the American Professional Society of the Abuse of Children, “[where she] conducts workshops on PTSD, delayed disclosure and memory blocking.”  In this case, Badger testified that she met with the victim on three separate occasions for a total of approximately three hours. She testified that “[t]he purpose of the meetings was to treat Victim for sexual abuse.”  It seems no one noticed that she first set out to “treat” the “victim” for “sexual abuse” and then later came to court to testify about whether it had happened or not.
The record reflects that according to Badger, PTSD is a “process that some people go through after they’ve experienced a traumatic event, such as sexual abuse.”  In a scintillating display of analytical acumen, Badger then testified that in her experience, victims “usually kind of bounce around among all those symptoms.”  Badger testified she knew PTSD “inside and out.” Next, “Badger explained the phenomenon of delayed disclosure of sexual abuse, “…a very common trait among child sexual abuse victims.” She then opined that the behaviors that the victim demonstrated were “consistent with” sexual abuse. 
Lopez v. State, 288 S.W.3d 148 (Tex. App. 2009).
Apparently the State did not like Dr. Hill’s testimony. He was arrested, following a grand jury indictment on Medicaid fraud charges.
http://www.caller.com/news/2008/Mar/29/local-psychologist-indicted-medicaid-fraud-is/ last visited May 19th, 2010.
Lopez v. State, 288 S.W.3d 148, 156.
Id. 288 S.W.3d at 156.
Id. 288 S.W.3d at 156.
Id. 288 S.W.3d at 156.
921 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super., 2007).
921 A.2d 1229, 1236.
Id. at 1237. And see: People v. Flippo, 159 P.3d 100 (Colo. 2007).
2010 WL 1509492 (Tex.App-Corpus Christi 2010).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3-*4.
Id. at *5-*6.
2010 WL 1509492 at *10.
Id. at *13.
329 S.W.3d 594 (Tex.App.Ct. 2010).
Id. at 598.
Id. at 599.
Id. at 599-600.
Id. at 600-601.
329 S.W.3d at 602.
Id. at 603.
Id. at 608.
Id. at 610.
See, i.e. the recent Senator Ted Stevens case and the investigation into cheating by Federal Prosecutors: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/09/AR2009040904300.html?hpid=topnews last visited April 20th, 2009
530 F.Supp.2d 1224 (U.S. D.C. D. N.M. 2008)
The Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct.
1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), “that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Also, in Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) the Court explained that the government has a duty to volunteer exculpatory evidence.
530 F.Supp.2d 1224, 1264.
530 F.Supp.2d 1224, 1267 citing to United States v. Cooper, 283 F.Supp.2d 1215, 1238 (D.Kan.2003) and United States v. Floyd, 247 F.Supp.2d 889, 899 (S.D.Ohio 2002)
283 Wis.2d 384, 700 N.W.2d 27, 2005 WI 114 (Wisc. 2005).
700 N.W.2d 27, 31. Thanks to the impressive professional work of psychologists Hollowell and Reisenauer, Charlotte “…now [also] believes that her paternal grandfather raped her. Additionally, regarding the physical abuse, Charlotte indicated she believed her mother beat her using fists and tried to kill her with a knife and by drowning.” Id.
Wilson v Phillips, 73 Cal App. 4th 250; 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 204 (Cal. App.4 Dist., 1999).
Id. 73 Cal App. 4th 250, 253; 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 204, 206.
Id. 73 Cal App. 4th 250, 253; 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 204, 206. emphasis added. The fact that the use of the phrase “consistent with” is frank causism – and the fact that human memory simply does not work this way, seems to have been over looked by the Appellate Court.
Id. 73 Cal App. 4th 250, 253; 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 204, 206.
Maggard v Board Psychology — S.W.3d —-, 2005 WL 3078625 (Ky.App.2005).
2005 WL 3078625 Pg 2.
Id. There seems to be no shortage of behavioral scientists “clutching at straws” to come up with a legal rationale when hired for forensic purposes. In Attorney Grievance Commission Of Maryland v. Randy A. Weiss, 389 Md. 531, 886 A.2d 606 (2005), a multi state disbarment action was undertaken after Randy Weiss admitted (and paid back) stealing over $670,000, on 54 occasions from his law firm. When pressed, the behavioral sciences witness’s only explanation for Weiss’s conduct was that he had a “psychological need for security borne out of his father’s depression-era fear of poverty.” 389 Md. 531, 555; 886 A.2d 606 (2005).
388 F.3d 1342 (10th Cir. 2004).
388 F.3d at 1345.
Id. For another example of a goofy expert gambit, see: Halvorsen v Plato Learning, Inc., 167 Fed. Appx. 524, 532 (6th Cir., 2006) Not Recommended For Full–Text Publication. Expert proposes to testify about the “psychological autopsy” performed on a deceased man to show that the Defendant Employer’s actions “led to his emotional condition and contributed to the auto accident.” The Federal District Court noted: “In this instance, Dr. Walker explained that she neither spoke with nor examined Bruce, did not review any of his medical records, relied entirely on anecdotal evidence supplied by [Plaintiff] and admitted that she had never performed a psychological autopsy before…”
388 F.3d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir 2004).
267 F. Supp.2d 161 (D.C.P.R. 2003).
267 F. Supp.2d at 162 – 163.
267 F. Supp.2d at 165.
267 F. Supp.2d at 165 – 166.
267 F. Supp.2d 161, 164.
267 F. Supp.2d at 165.
267 F. Supp.2d 161, 167.
113 S.W.3d 819 ( 2004 Texas App – Austin).
113 S.W.3d at 825.
113 S.W.3d 819, 825. There was testimony that other witnesses regarded her as a liar and a manipulator.
113 S.W.3d at 827.
See, e.g. CHAPTER TWO of this update discussing: Delayed disclosure; the long-term effects of child abuse; hyperclaiming and the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome of our favorite junk scientist Roland Summit.
113 S.W.3d 819, 831.
113 S.W.3d at 834.
State v Henry, 329 S.C. 266; 495 S.E.2d 463 (S.C. App., 1997).
See, e.g.: Lorandos, D. and Campbell, T. (1995) Myths and Realities of Sexual Abuse Evaluation and Diagnosis: A Call for Judicial Guidelines 7 Issues in Child Abuse Accusations 1.
State v Henry, 329 S.C. 266; 495 S.E.2d 463, 468 (S.C. App., 1997).
State v Henry, 329 S.C. 266; 495 S.E.2d 463, 469 (S.C. App., 1997). The record does not indicate that anyone took her to task about just what PTSD or “memory blocking” might be. Please see Chapter Five in the initial publication of Cross Examining Experts in the Behavioral Sciences, and in this update. The American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children is located in Oklahoma. A.P.S.A.C. was created in 1987 by a group of notable believe-the-children, abuse validators like social workers: Kee MacFarlane (of the McMartin Pre-School debacle – State v Bucky, Superior Court, Los Angeles County, California Docket No. A 750900 (1990).) and Jon Conte (of the Menendez and Hungerford embarrassments [People of the State of California vs. Erik Galen Menendez & Joseph Lyle Menendez County of Los Angeles File No. BA 068880 & State of New Hampshire v Joel Hungerford, Hillsborough County, New Hampshire – No. 95-429]). It is noteworthy, that one of the leading proponents of the junk science concept of “repressed memory” [“The reason I keep getting parking tickets and I can’t balance my checkbook and I keep getting fired from jobs and I’m on my fourth spouse…is that I was raped by a family member when I was five and you know what…I just forgot about it…”] is psychologist John Briere. Conte and Briere are on the Board of Directors of A.P.S.A.C.
State v Henry, 329 S.C. 266; 495 S.E.2d 463, 466 (S.C. App., 1997) emphasis added.
Id. 329 S.C. 266; 495 S.E.2d 463, 466.
Id. 329 S.C. 266; 495 S.E.2d 463, 466.
Id. In these few citations from the record, we find diagnoses with little or no reliability; an affiliation of folks whose orientation is to believe something happened and then search for (or create) confirmatory evidence; a witness whose initial task was treatment, now shifting roles to “expert”; a witness whose capacity for differential diagnosis seemed non-existent; who hyperclaimed her background; using loaded words like “disclosure” to imply that something had really happened and she, with her skill, got to the bottom of it; who then committed the error of affirming the consequent; and engaged in flagrant causism. We can also surmise a cross examiner asleep at the switch.